Only recently has the study of southern politics begun to emerge from the shadows cast by C. Vann Woodward's Origins of the New South and V. O. Key's Southern Politics in State and Nation.¹ These two brilliant and intimidating volumes appeared at mid-century—Origins in 1951 and Southern Politics in 1949—and for a generation have largely dominated the writing of post-Reconstruction southern political history. New works continued to be published, and a considerable number of them were quite good; but rarely did they stray much beyond the parameters established by Woodward and Key.

The main features of the Woodward-Key synthesis are well-known. Although the two authors differed in emphasis and conflicted on specific points, they both advanced Beardian interpretations that emphasized economic conflict between the haves and have-nots of southern society. Both regarded race as something of an "artificial" issue that disrupted the "natural" alliance of have-nots across color lines. In Woodward's analysis, the Civil War and Emancipation broke planter domination of southern politics and transferred power to modernizing bourgeois elites composed of merchants, businessmen, and industrialists. The Populist movement was an assault by agrarian have-nots on the exploitive Redeemer policies at home and the shortsighted Redeemer Right Fork alliance with northeastern capitalism nationally. With the failure of the Populist revolt, town and business oriented middle class Progressives led the South back into national politics, albeit not before shackling the region with disfranchisement, the one-party system, and de jure segregation. Key's study focused on the debilitating results of these institutions. For more than half a century they stunted southern political development and undermined the formation of a biracial New Deal coalition of have-nots.

A Woodward-Key synthesis structured the teaching and writing of New South politics for three decades. Much of this analysis remains valid today, of course—indeed, Key's Southern Politics is still largely unchallenged—but in recent years vague outlines of a different synthesis have begun to emerge. Comparative history, especially comparative studies of slavery, has par-

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particularly influenced the new literature. The experiences of other plantation societies have suggested new approaches to the study of southern history, and, following a decade of lavish attention to slavery and the antebellum South, researchers have extended their interests into the post-Reconstruction era. As with the study of slavery and the Old South, class, labor, and race relations and their ideological manifestations have been central points of concern. Generally, recent literature has tended to stress the distinctiveness of southern society rather than its similarity with the states to the north, and in varying degrees has emphasized continuity from the Old South to the New rather than change. The trend seems clearly away from "psychological" explanations for southern political behavior—mythology, romanticism, separate and nationally unique historical experiences, individual and psychological racism, and the like. Instead recent studies, which have often been Marxist or quasi-Marxist in orientation, have tended to link the attitudes and ideologies of social groups to the labor system, social structure, economic organization, and class relationships in the region.

Doubtless, Eugene D. Genovese is the scholar most responsible for laying the foundations for new directions in southern historiography, although Barrington Moore and William A. Williams have been important sources of theory. Genovese has emphasized the "special social, economic, political, ideological, and psychological content" of antebellum southern society. Although a part of the world capitalist economy, the South, according to Genovese, "did not have an essentially market society" and consequently was basically different from the increasingly laissez-faire society of northern states. The prebourgeois southern planter class espoused an ideology of paternalism that bore little resemblance to the free labor ideology popular among northern elites and especially those who joined the Republican party. Such differences ultimately produced civil war.

The Civil War and Emancipation broke the national power of the southern planters, but the extent to which "their way of life and its attendant ideology went down also" has become the central question of contemporary scholarship. If the Old South was an established and prosperous society with its own economic, social, and ideological foundations, why would such a society so quickly collapse in the wake of Appomattox and the Thirteenth Amendment, particularly since the Radical Republican attempt to reconstruct that society ended in failure? The answer to this question remains debatable, but at least for the moment the initiative has plainly passed to the proponents of continuity.

Only the boldest scholars have suggested that nothing very important happened during the 1860s; yet a variety of studies have documented important elements of continuity that survived the transition. Economic historians con-
continue to disagree about the causes of southern postwar poverty, but they are largely in agreement that the South remained economically distinct from the rest of the nation long after the end of Reconstruction. Some works, such as Jay R. Mandle's *The Roots of Black Poverty*, have focused on the plantation as the central institution in southern life and have insisted that plantation agriculture continued to dominate southern development through the first third of the twentieth century. Other recent studies have revived the once popular theory that the Civil War consolidated the South's position as a dependent colonial appendage to the North. Even if the South was in Joseph Persky's apt term a “favored colony,” its peripheral position as an internal colony was, as Woodward argued in *Origins of the New South*, a central element in shaping its political relations with the northern core.

Urban historians have tended in recent years to study southern urbanization within a regional context and to suggest that southern cities, rather than being the aggressive vanguards of the New South, were economically, culturally, racially, and in a variety of other ways strongly influenced if not substantially shaped by the surrounding countryside. As David R. Goldfield has argued, ruralism, race, and colonialism molded nationally distinctive southern urban communities within a nationally distinctive region. Howard N. Rabinowitz has demonstrated that race relations changed less dramatically during the post-Civil War era than had previously been assumed. Not only did segregation become the normal form of race relations soon after Emancipation but it was largely preceded by exclusion of blacks altogether rather than integration. These and other works have suggested new directions in southern political research.

The two books that have contributed most directly to a reinterpretation of New South politics are Jonathan M. Wiener’s *Social Origins of the New South* and Dwight B. Billings's *Planters and the Making of a “New South.”* Both works are controversial, and they are on some questions more provocative than convincing. At the same time they have stimulated a rethinking of political and social development in the New South, and they, perhaps more than any other studies of post-Reconstruction politics, have managed to incorporate much of the recent literature on the South into logically coherent interpretations. Borrowing from Barrington Moore, both Billings and Wiener find the New South following the “Prussian Road” to modernization.

Of the two works, Billings’s study of North Carolina stresses continuity with a vengeance. He finds basic links in North Carolina “between the world the slaveholders built and the world they rebuilt after their nationalist failure.” The precapitalist planter class promoted industrial self-sufficiency prior to the Civil War, and, following that unpleasantness, elements of “North Carolina’s landed upper class provided postwar leadership in textile
manufacturing, banking, insurance, railroad building, and other large business enterprises." In so doing they transferred agrarian social relations and planter ideology into industry, especially in the important case of the mill village. Since only the upper echelon of more prosperous planters possessed the excess capital to participate in these ventures, the lesser landholders, themselves intensely conservative and traditionalist, organized the Populist party. After the demise of the Populists and the disfranchisement of blacks, "the landed upper class could begin to use state government as an instrument for modernization." Thus Billings offers a relatively straightforward account of "a revolution from above" that produced "conservative modernization" in North Carolina.11

Jonathan Wiener's analysis of developments in Alabama is more complex. As in North Carolina, a "dominant nonbourgeois planter class" guided Alabama's social and economic development along the Prussian Road "that preserves and intensifies the authoritarian and repressive elements of traditional social relations." This path was by no means a smooth one. Planters encountered a series of challenges from newly freed blacks, merchants, and industrialists. These conflicts forced planters to compromise, but they did not overturn landlord leadership. The blacks compelled planters to abandon the gang system of plantation labor, but the resulting system of tenancy, along with debt peonage and northern corporate imperialism, were crucial factors in limiting the extent of Alabama's economic development. The planters successfully routed the merchants and checked the expansion of commercial values in the plantation counties, but the merchants did become established in nonplantation counties. When industrialists and their New South bourgeois spokesmen vied for ideological hegemony with the New South creed, planters and their allies struck back with the Myth of the Lost Cause. Finally, with the "threat from below" by "the Populist tenant farmers," the previously antagonistic planters and industrialists joined together in a Prussian Road alliance.12

A concept so encompassing as the Prussian Road to capitalism raises almost as many questions as it answers. The theory includes a number of assumptions regarding the solidarity within a dominant class, the nature of class conflict, and the reality of ruling class "hegemony," the latter being defined as the ability of a ruling class to convert the rest of society to its ideology, that are not altogether self-evident, especially to non-Marxist scholars. The very nature of this approach to the study of southern history may well tend to exaggerate the extent of continuity between the Old South and the New. Yet the studies by Billings and Wiener have focused attention on fundamental social and political questions. It is true that coercive forms of labor control remained common in the region long after the demise of slavery, and it is surely arguable that the South moved toward industrializa-
tion without establishing a bourgeois "political and social democracy." At any rate conventional wisdom no longer assumes that the Redeemers "were of middle-class origin, having but nominal connections with the old planter regime and with primarily an industrial, capitalist outlook." 13

A number of state studies published over the past dozen or so years have suggested that Redeemer economic policies were less oriented toward business and industrial development than had been generally assumed. Governing a poverty-stricken region, Bourbon governments could hardly fail to favor economic progress. Five states gave tax concessions to new industry, several continued at least for a time the Reconstruction policy of providing state aid for railroad construction, and none showed a noticeable interest in conserving public lands. Yet, nine of the eleven southern states adopted new constitutions during the 1870s and 1880s, and they consistently denied state monetary support to private endeavors and in other ways circumscribed expenditures for the internal improvements that would have been necessary to promote rapid industrial growth. The Bourbon preoccupation with social stability, low taxes, and limited government does not necessarily suggest a governing elite preoccupied with economic development. James Tice Moore, after surveying the literature on the Bourbon period, concluded: "Recent state studies for the most part suggest that traditionalist, agriculturally oriented elites grasped the New South as firmly as they had the Old." 14

These trends in southern scholarship are apt to spur renewed interest in the spokesmen for the New South. The standard study of the subject remains Paul M. Gaston's The New South Creed. Largely developing points suggested by Woodward's interpretation, Gaston argued that the New South idea was a program for a new departure that flourished in the political atmosphere provided by the commercial and industrial orientation of the capitalist Redeemer governments. Its goal was sectional reconciliation, racial peace, and "a new economic and social order based on industry and scientific, diversified agriculture...." Although there was for a time conflict between the defenders of the cult of the Lost Cause and the advocates of a New South, the latter soon incorporated "the romantic, idealized legend of the Old South" into their New South vision. At approximately the same time, the New South creed underwent another "metamorphosis and soon came to be a description not of what ought to be, but of what already was." 15 Thus, according to Gaston's analysis, Henry W. Grady and his ideological kinsmen adopted during the early 1880s a romanticized Old South and increasingly insisted that the New South was an accomplished fact, despite the region's laggard economic growth.

In a perceptive chapter in Social Origins of the New South, Wiener offers a new and in many ways a more intrinsically satisfying explanation for the
evolution of the New South creed. Like Gaston, Wiener views New South spokesmen as propagandists for bourgeois values, but thereafter the two interpretations increasingly diverge. "The ideologists of the New South," Wiener states, "were attempting to cast off the cultural domination of the planter class . . . ." The planters responded with a glorification of the Old South, and "the New South ideologists embraced the Old South myth because they were not strong enough to attack it, even though it posed a sharp critique of their own program." Thwarted in their drive for ideological hegemony, the spokesmen for the New South professed allegiance to the Old South in "a strategic attempt at accommodation with an opponent they were unable to defeat," moderated their program, and accepted the status quo as the fulfillment of their goals.16

Other writers have offered alternative interpretations of the New South movement. Dwight Billings found no conflict between the cult of the Old South and the idea of the New South, since the powerholders in the Old South also dominated the New South.17 In a recent survey of southern history, I. A. Newby suggests that the New South creed was in part "a formula for colonializing the southern economy and inveigling the southern people to accommodate themselves to the needs of the colonializers."18 Although Newby does not fully develop the point, it does perhaps merit consideration. As the New South movement progressed, it increasingly envisioned southern industrial development through the importation of northern capital. By basing the industrial future of the region on the propitiation of dominant economic interests in the North, New South advocates clearly limited the scope of their movement and thus may not have been quite the hard-driving modernizers that they have often been depicted as.

However the debates over the principal features of the Redeemer era are resolved, the most fundamental challenge to the established order was the Populist revolt. For a time the embattled Populists were under attack from a variety of scholarly sources. Richard Hofstader’s assault from a consensus perspective on populism’s reform credentials in The Age of Reform is well known, and that book led to a general decline in Populist prestige in academic circles. The most significant attempt to apply Hofstader’s assumptions to the study of southern populism was Sheldon Hackney’s Populism to Progressivism in Alabama. Hackney found Alabama Populists to be motivated by “feelings of powerlessness,” by “emotions such as hatred or resentment,” and by an addiction to “conspiracy theories.” More interested in power than policy, Hackney’s Populists “lacked an ideology” and “were, patently, not reformers.”19 Roger L. Hart, in his study of Redeemers, Bourbons, and Populists in Tennessee, came to somewhat similar if less devastating conclusions regarding the origins of the Peoples Party.20
Robert H. Wiebe’s influential *The Search for Order*, which rested upon a modernization theoretical framework, found the Populists to be “narrowly local” defenders of island community values at a time when leadership was passing to national elites. On the Left, William A. Williams dismissed the Populists as petty bourgeois defenders of a declining stage of capitalist economic development. More recently both Billings and Wiener, their emphasis directed toward the struggle for “hegemony” among dominant elites, have dealt with populism in a relatively cursory manner.

Despite all of this, southern Populists have survived with their radical credentials relatively intact. Woodward, in *Origins of the New South* and elsewhere, treated the Populists with great sympathy, and his interpretation remained more or less standard in historical surveys of the South and in state histories. Quite recently, it has been enthusiastically reaffirmed in Lawrence Goodwyn’s *Democratic Promise.* Although the Populists were authentic local reformers, the central thrust of their movement, according to Goodwyn, was an attack on northeastern finance capitalism. Woodward labeled the chapter in *Origins of the New South* that deals with the maturing of populism “The Revolt Against the East,” a title that would summarize Goodwyn’s interpretation. *Democratic Promise* assumes that the Redeemer opponents of populism were bourgeois businessmen, but, if the studies cited earlier in this essay are correct in arguing that agricultural interests remained dominant in the New South, there is little in Goodwyn’s analysis that would fail to support the theory that populism in the South was a small farmer revolt from colonial dependency and a plantation oriented leadership that accepted northeastern corporate domination in exchange for “home rule.”

Goodwyn stresses economic motivations in accounting for the origins of populism and he vigorously rejects interpretations that find Populists driven by status anxieties, narrow provincialism, or reactionary values. Although less encompassing in its interpretation, Robert C. McMath’s study of the Southern Farmers’ Alliance, while more sensitive than Goodwyn’s work to the complexities and even contradictions within the movement, also stresses its seriousness of purpose and the rationality of its solutions to the crushing problems of southern agriculture. McMath dwells on the cultural and religious factors that both strengthened Alliance solidarity and complicated its transformation into a third party, but his “community of true believers” seems not to differ in any basic way from the “movement culture” described by Goodwyn. A more recent examination of southern Populist thought by Bruce Palmer is also a relatively sympathetic treatment of southern populism’s “distinctive and valid criticism of American industrial and financial capitalism.”

Although Populists have largely retained their folk hero reputation, southern Progressives are considerably less secure in their status as reformers.
In Origins of the New South, Woodward noted the "paradoxical combination of white supremacy and progressivism" and suggested that the Progressive movement failed to fulfill "the political aspirations and deeper needs of the mass of people" in the South. Thereafter southern progressivism fared increasingly well in southern scholarship. During the 1960s progressivism was generally depicted as "an amalgam of agrarian radicalism, business regulation, good government, and urban social justice reforms [that] became in the end a movement for positive government." This interpretation remains popular, of course, although the most recent survey of southern progressivism is far more cautious in its conclusions. Written from a modernization perspective, Jack Temple Kirby's Darkness at the Dawning finds southern Progressives divided into two wings, the stronger of which was a rural-based antitrust movement that sought to defend local values while the other was "urban-based, professional-minded, bureaucratizing and centralizing" in thrust. Although Kirby regards segregation and disfranchisement as the "seminal" Progressive reforms, he locates substantial continuity between populism and progressivism and deemphasizes class analysis to stress white consensus on "the great race settlement of 1890–1910."

Other studies have taken a basically different approach to progressivism. In a work on Virginia progressivism published more than a decade ago, Raymond H. Pulley concluded that "the reform impulse sprang from the conserving or reactionary tendencies inherent in the culture of the Commonwealth rather than from a desire to reconcile the state to the march of modern America." As studies of national progressivism have increasingly tended to identify the movement with elitist and corporate capitalist values, Pulley's description of an established leadership, threatened by independent movements, launching a program to restore and buttress the old order has gained broader acceptability. A recent study of the period in a Deep South state reports "Progressive reform in Georgia was conservative, elitist, and above all racist."

This trend in scholarship received its most vigorous and most impressive expression in J. Morgan Kousser's The Shaping of Southern Politics. According to Kousser's interpretation, southern progressivism was a reaction to lower class insurgency that threatened the Democratic party's domination of political power in the South. Democratic elites responded with a "revolt against democracy" that sought "the stabilization of society, especially the economy, in the interests of the local established powers, at the expense of the lower strata of society in the South, and sometimes at the expense of out-of-state corporations." The leading proponents of this program of disfranchisement and reform were plantation elites who "bore striking resemblances to antebellum 'patricians.'"

Kousser's study emphasizes the disfranchisement movement and may not
offer an adequate interpretation for progressivism as a whole. Yet, if the Redeemers were more closely associated with conservative agricultural values than had once been believed, then it would not be surprising to learn that the Progressive "search for order" contained a strong element of reaction. Modernization theorists have frequently advanced a dual economy thesis which assumes that changes in an economically underdeveloped area would come first to the cities, thereby for a time dividing the modernizing cities from the "traditional" countryside. It may well be that planter oriented rural Progressives endeavored to buttress the old social order with disfranchisement and other programs, that urban Progressive elites promoted various modernizing reforms as Kirby and others have suggested, and that a considerable number of farmers and townsmen retreated into a defense of local values that included a politics of demagoguery and a largely ineffective opposition to northern based corporate enterprise.

In any event, the "synthesis" fashioned during the Progressive era, as George B. Tindall has observed, "governed southern politics through the first half of the twentieth century." Although students of southern politics have devoted relatively little attention to the 1920s, 30s, and 40s, the literature would overwhelmingly support Tindall's observation. During these years, the region solidified its reputation as "the benighted South," "the Nation's No. 1 economic problem," and the home of race-baiting demagogues. V. O. Key, after examining the politics of the period, stated "The South may not be the nation's number one political problem, as some northerners assert, but politics is the South's number one problem." The current state of scholarship on the post-Progressive era strongly suggests that, whatever the positive features of Progressive reform, the results were clearly limited.

Key identified the failures of southern politics with the one-party system. As Key explained, "in the confusions and distractions of one-party politics broad issues of economic philosophy are often obscured or smothered by irrelevant appeals, sectional loyalties, local patriotism, personal candidacies, and, above all, by the specter of the black man." More fundamentally, Key emphasized the success of white elites in the black-belt plantation counties in impressing "on an entire region a philosophy agreeable to its necessities and succeeded for many decades in maintaining a regional unity in national politics to defend these necessities." Although often challenged, socio-economically privileged whites of the black belt emerged victorious from the crucial political crises in southern history and were the primary architects of the system of white supremacy and disfranchisement that the one-party system rested upon and defended. Normally allied with town merchants, businessmen, and industrialists, plantation-oriented whites induced other groups within southern society "to subordinate to the race question all great
social and economic issues that tend to divide people into opposing parties." 33 Even though Key failed to employ "hegemony," "prebourgeois," and other key words and concepts of today, his analysis would not conflict with recent reinterpretations of earlier periods of southern history.

More recent studies have augmented *Southern Politics* without upsetting its general interpretive framework. George B. Tindall, who in *The Emergence of the New South* and other studies has contributed more toward an understanding of southern politics between the wars than any other recent writer, has viewed southern politics from a traditionalist Progressive perspective and has emphasized the "business progressivism" of southern state governments in the 1920s. 34 Blaine A. Brownell has demonstrated that a growth-oriented "white commercial-civic elite" dominated politics in the region's larger cities during the 1920s, and Morton Sosna has traced the activities of the section's tiny reform-minded intelligentsia. Robert A. Garson's *The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism* is a valuable study of the political animosities that centered around civil rights issues within the national party during the 1940s. 35 Few state studies of southern politics between the wars have appeared. 36

It is no doubt a tribute to *Southern Politics* that, whereas there are relatively few works dealing with the period Key studied, an outpouring of literature examines southern politics during the years since the book was published. A significant portion of these works investigate the reentry of blacks into southern politics. While the history of blacks as participants in—rather than objects of—southern politics is yet to be written, an impressive number of competent works have examined southern black political behavior since the *Smith v. Allwright* decision of 1944. Two Atlanta journalists, Pat Watters and Reese Cleghorn, present probably the most moving account of the black struggle for the ballot; two political scientists, Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, provide the most intensely scholarly study of blacks and New South politics. David J. Garrow's *Protest at Selma* is the best study of the 1965 Voting Rights law, and Steven F. Lawson's *Black Ballots* is perhaps the best overview of the expansion of voting rights in the South. 37

Another group of studies has analyzed the broader trends in southern politics since *Southern Politics*. *The Changing Politics of the South*, edited by William C. Havard, examines political developments in each of the southern states. Jack Bass and Walter DeVries in *The Transformation of Southern Politics* rely heavily on interviews to draw relatively sanguine conclusions about the course of southern politics since V. O. Key. Hugh D. Graham and I are more cautious about the prospects for two-party competition or for political cleavages along class rather than racial lines in *Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction*. Earl Black's *Southern Governors and Civil Rights*
weighs the impact of black voting on the campaigns and policies of southern chief executives. Donald S. Strong has traced the sources of southern Republicanism in a series of studies. These works have provided valuable insights; certainly more is known about politics in the South since World War II than about any other region. At the same time, each of these studies generally adopts Key’s approach and extends his analysis into the more recent period.

Whatever the merits of such a research strategy, it may not be adequate to answer the more fundamental questions posed by recent southern political developments. In 1940 the raison d’être of southern state governments was the protection of white supremacy and social stability; thirty years later their central purpose was the promotion of business and industrial development. Key emphasized conflict between haves and have-nots, which often took the form of dissension between black belt and hills or city and countryside. But in terms of ideology and public policy, a good argument could be made that the have-nots had lost—or at least were well along the way to losing—the war by the time Key described it. Beginning with Mississippi’s Balance Agriculture With Industry program in 1936, all the southern states established industry hunting agencies and structured programs of tax concessions and public support for industrial development. All enacted right-to-work provisions and firmly placed state authority on the side of entrepreneurial and corporate profits. During the same period the southern states in varying degrees vastly improved public education, expanded or originated the merit system in public bureaucracy, and adopted more rational procedures for collecting and disbursing public monies. The elimination of the one-party system, disfranchisement, legislative malapportionment, and de jure segregation was of great importance to the triumph of these policies, but they do not appear to have been closely related to the sporadic battles between the haves and have-nots.

Instead, these developments suggest that the emerging periodization of New South politics may focus on the 1930s or 1940s as a great and, as yet, an ill-understood watershed. Recent interpretations indicate that in fundamental ways there was considerable continuity during the decades following Reconstruction. The labor relations of plantations and mill villages, the social structure with its foundation resting on caste relationships, and an ideology that for want of a better term is usually labeled paternalism may have provided an underlying stability that limited the impact of the undeniable changes that swept across the South during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These tendencies in the literature are imminently debatable and are apt to fuel an abundance of scholarly controversy. But, then, as V. O. Key observed: “Of books about the South there is no end.”

2. Some of the best of this literature is sampled in Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords, eds., *Myth and Southern History* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1974).


32. Key, *Southern Politics*, p. 3.
33. Ibid., pp. 255, 9, 315-16.


39. Only in Louisiana did these policies meet serious resistance; there the Long forces repealed the right-to-work law for industrial workers. James C. Cobb, *The Selling of the South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, forthcoming), is the first general study of southern industrial promotion in the post-World War II era.