TIBERIUS GRACCHUS: THE OPPOSITION VIEW.

The ancient writers of the history of the second century B.C. emphasized, somewhat exaggeratedly, no doubt, that the conflict which ended in the death of Tiberius Gracchus was the first violent civil conflict in the history of the Roman Republic. Certainly the assassination of Tiberius was the first important civil outbreak in many years. It seems difficult, therefore, to try to explain why, after so long a period of relatively peaceful politics, the senatorial opponents of Tiberius should have become so disturbed by his program that, led by Scipio Nasica, the pontifex maximus, they resorted to crude violence. The answer has usually been thought a simple one. However, it is not so simple as it seems, and it is not to be deduced entirely from the specific proposals of Tiberius. In large part, the answer must be sought in the political and intellectual climate which had developed among the Roman nobilitas.

This paper is an attempt to reconstruct, in a necessarily limited way, the picture which Tiberius Gracchus evoked in the minds of his opponents, what so frightened them that they were willing to kill to stop it. The quick answer, the usual answer, is that his major opponents had been hurt economically through the operation of his agrarian law. He had confiscated public land which they held in order to distribute it to the poor. Nothing, it is remarked, hurts like a stab in the pocketbook. But here is by no means a full answer. If this were the casus belli, then the murder should have come months earlier when the agrarian law was first proposed or immediately upon passage, in order to prevent its going into operation. Instead, it is seen that neither before nor after Tiberius' death was any effort made specifically to undo the recovery and redistribution of land already accomplished. In fact, the land commission was reorganized and permitted to continue its work for at least three

1 See, for example, Plutarch, Ti. Gracchus, 20. The long period of peaceful civil affairs is generally accepted by historians. Tenney Frank says, "History can show no parallel to Rome's first four republican centuries of progressive political reform accomplished without violence in primary assembles" (Aspects of Social Behavior in Ancient Rome [Cambridge, Mass., 1932], p. 107).
or four years after Tiberius’ death.² The direct economic motive, then, while no doubt strong, was not the precipitating factor. The nobles feared some future action; they suspected that Tiberius aimed for some sort of complete overturn; and their apprehensions drove them to violence.

Before they were driven so far, it should again be emphasized, the opponents of Tiberius had been willing to put up with a good deal from him. Modern historians have usually presented Tiberius as a political maverick with a novel program, but initially, at least, he was not so regarded by his contemporaries. An investigation of his family and political background—usually overlooked—will demonstrate why he was not at first stamped a revolutionary. His agrarian proposal, though thought unwise and even somewhat radical, was hardly a complete surprise, for it was not altogether unlike some measures previously undertaken by the political faction to which Tiberius belonged. This fact and this faction deserve closer attention than they have received in the past.

The important work in unravelling the family-political groupings in Rome of the late third and early second century B.C. done by Friedrich Münzer and others is useful to this phase of the problem.³ Unfortunately, Münzer’s work does not treat adequately the Gracchan period, and there is no definitive work for these years. But it is quite clear that in the 140’s and 130’s B.C. there were two major political factions in Rome: the

² At least until 129 B.C., when certain judicial functions of the commission apparently were given over to one of the consuls. See Appian, Civil Wars, I, 19. The work of the commission is dealt with at length by J. Carcopino, in Autour des Gracques (Paris, 1928), pp. 125 ff. Plutarch’s view (Ti. Gracchus, 22) was that the continued work of the commission was a mere sop to the people.

³ Münzer’s chief work is Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien (Stuttgart, 1920). Also valuable are many biographical articles by the same author in the Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Earlier works on which Münzer depended include W. Drumann and P. Groebe, Geschichte Roms in seinem Uebergange von der republikanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung, 6 vols. (2nd ed., Berlin, 1889-1929), and M. Gelzer, Die Nobilität der römischen Republik (Leipzig, 1912). Those who wish to avoid the badly written and poorly organized book of Münzer will find much of the same material, revised and better treated in H. H. Scullard, Roman Politics 220-150 B.C. (Oxford, 1951).
Claudians and the Scipionians. A group important earlier, the Fabians, had declined and been absorbed by the others. The Metelli were in process of forming yet another family-political alliance which was to be important for some decades after the Gracchi. It is also clear that Tiberius Gracchus belonged to the Claudian group—in spite of the ancestry of his mother, a daughter of Scipio Africanus. The elder Gracchus was an opponent of Scipio Africanus in his lifetime and married Cornelia only after Africanus' death. An incident which occurred in his second consulship (163 B.C.) illustrates his continued partisanship against the Scipionians: when he held the elections for 162, two Scipionians were elected, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica and C. Marcius Figulus; several weeks later, when Nasica was already en route to his new province, Gracchus suddenly "remembered" he had not taken the auspices. He annulled the elections, which were held again, and two other persons were elected. The tribune of 133 was supported by his father-in-law, Appius Claudius, a leader of the Claudian faction, and opposed by his relative by marriage and adoption, Scipio Aemilianus, leader of the opposing Scipionic faction.

On at least three or four occasions earlier in the second century the Claudian faction, in a colonization program somewhat unlike preceding ones which had established numerous military colonies, settled many Romans on publicly owned land, mostly in the Ager Gallicus (Umbria), in the Ager Calletanus (Etruria), and in the Po valley. Members of the Sempronian family had partici-

4 Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus*, I.
6 Factional politics in the program of Gracchus have been recognized. Konrad Bilz has remarked, "Like all Roman political crises, the work of [Ti.] Gracchus was also a crisis and a struggle between the separate parties," in his "Die Politik des Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus," *Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft*, VII (1936), p. 66. See also Gelzer, *op. cit.*, p. 108.
7 See, for example, Livy, XXXIX, 44, 10-11 and 55, 7-9. It is particularly interesting that Polybius, whose work betrays something of a bias against the Claudians and for the Scipionians, pointed to one such colonization program (in II, 21) and pronounced it "the first step in the demoralization of the people." If this was a late addition to his history (see note 23), there was for him a direct link between these earlier schemes and the legislation of Tiberius Gracchus.
pated in the settlement of the *Ager Gallicus*, and Tiberius Gracchus’ father had been involved in one such colonization program, serving on the commission which founded a citizen colony at Saturnia in Etruria.\(^8\) The tendency of Roman sons to follow in their fathers’ footsteps is relevant to this investigation. It was no accident that Tiberius served as quaestor in Spain and Gaius in Sardinia, in both instances provinces where their father had earlier served also. These colonization schemes had served a useful purpose. But they also, no doubt, benefitted the Claudian faction. And although little used of late, any similar plan would be recognized by the Scipionians as a familiar political tactic. So when Tiberius Gracchus brought forward his land law, supported by the Claudians, he appeared to his opponents not a revolutionary but simply another Claudian opportunist, perhaps stung by the disaster of his quaestorship\(^9\) and so a little more radical than the usual Claudian. However, in view of the combination of depression and shortage of grain with consequent high prices that then plagued the city,\(^10\) the extent of his proposals could not have been very astonishing.

The land law was strongly opposed by the Scipionians and others, but the Claudians as has been said were in support of the measure. After its passage Appius Claudius himself, along with the Gracchus brothers, served on the commission of three for redistributing the land. In his early months in office, then, Tiberius seemed to fit very nearly the usual family and faction pattern. The work of the tribune up to this point—and especially the deposition of his colleague Octavius—was resented, to be sure, but there was as yet no talk of violence. We must look further to find what actions of his most disturbed his enemies, and why they disturbed them.

What really infuriated Tiberius’ opponents, it appears, were

---


\(^9\) At any rate Tiberius’ opponents later so explained his motives. (Tiberius was with Hostilius Mancinus in 137 B.C. before Numantia in Spain when Roman forces were humiliatingly defeated and forced to draw up a treaty later rejected as disgraceful by the Senate.) See Plutarch, *T. Gracchus*, 5-7; Velleius, II, 2, 1; Cicero, *Brutus*, 103; Florus, II, 2, 2.

those measures of his which were constitutionally significant. A listing of these measures, with some indication of constitutional implications, is pertinent.

1. It has been mentioned that Tiberius pushed through a kind of recall election of the tribune, Octavius, who opposed his agrarian law. It is easy to overlook the implication of this measure. The Roman constitution was set up along dual lines. The major officials, elected by the comitia centuriata, were by tradition responsible to the Senate, which generally controlled their election, and were expected both to guide this body (at least the consuls were) and to follow its decrees. The tribunes, on the other hand, with their great obstructive power, were elected in the comitia tributa (or the concilium plebis), and as the Gracchi showed, were potentially capable of exercising great legislative power in that assembly, completely aside from the curule officials and the Senate. The potentiality in this essentially divided system was toward a chaotic struggle such as did finally develop in the first century B.C. The aristocrats in general were aware of the need for one of these antithetical branches of government to dominate the other. The famed balance of the constitution was largely a fiction and a practical impossibility. The nobles therefore had weakened the tribunate by exerting great effort to see that one or more of the tribunes was sympathetic to their aims. They had been able to do this for at least a century and a half and also, consequently, they had maintained a stable government and a fairly continuous policy. In recent decades, they had also made a tremendous personal profit out of the arrangement, which gave their chief members juicy governorships and other military commands. To put into the hands of the concilium plebis the potential power to set up a panel of tribunes, all of whom might support one popular champion, was to destroy the system that existed and to insure the kind of disastrous competition that later destroyed the Republic.

2. Tiberius proposed that the tribal assembly dispose of the treasury of Attalus, King of Pergamum who died in 133 B.C., willing his kingdom to Rome. The money he wished to use to make his agrarian scheme of resettlement operable. This challenged the traditional control of the purse by the Senate, for
the whole process of appropriating, spending, and minting of coins was controlled by the nobles, chiefly through the quaestors and other officials. It should be remembered that direct taxation in Italy had ceased in 167 B. C. so that the provinces were now the chief source of revenue for the Roman state. Tiberius’ plan not only threatened one of the major powers of the Senate; it also introduced what was for Rome a novel idea for the expenditure of public money, direct spending on a large scale for the benefit of lower-class citizens.

3. Tiberius proposed that the tribal assembly should settle the affairs of the new province, Pergamum (later Asia), thereby threatening Senatorial control of the provinces.\(^{11}\) The term “province,” of course, still denoted primarily a military post, and it may be doubted that Tiberius was challenging the general authority of the provincial governors. In a new province, the Senate ordinarily sent a commission to help the provincial governor draw up the city charters and otherwise regularize affairs and the Senate then ratified the arrangements. But if the tribes could control arrangements in a new province, the tribunes might also claim further, regular powers. Expansion into empire had increased the importance of financial and political control of the provinces, and these powers would become yet more important in the future. Perhaps it is not incidental to Tiberius’ interest in Asia that his father had had extensive diplomatic service in that area.\(^{12}\)

4. Contrary to constitutional precedent, Tiberius proposed to succeed himself in office. He had already cast the tribune in the role of leader of the state and not merely guardian of the rights of plebeians; now this new role bade fair to become permanent.\(^{13}\)

5. According to Plutarch,\(^{14}\) Tiberius also used the obstructive

\(^{11}\) It should be noted that Carcopino rejects the whole of Tiberius’ reported dealings regarding Pergamum, on what seems to the author inadequate data in view of the strong literary evidence. He also doubts other reports of Tiberius’ excesses in office; see Autour des Gracques, pp. 17 ff., 34 ff., passim.

\(^{12}\) In 165 B. C. and again in 162-161. See Polybius, XXX, 7-8; 27; XXXI, 1, 3, 15, 19, 32, and 33.

\(^{13}\) See H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero (London, 1959), pp. 29 f.

\(^{14}\) Ti. Gracchus, 10, 5-6. Plutarch’s chronology is obviously faulty
powers of the tribune in an arbitrary and probably novel fashion, halting all public business and threatening quaestors and praetors who disobeyed him.

It is universally conceded that Tiberius was high-minded and idealistic, interested chiefly in doing something for his poverty-stricken compatriots. But it must be conceded on the other hand that these were very sweeping precedents which he was establishing and that he was introducing them in ways that to his aristocratic opposition at least must have seemed "unconstitutional," to use a modern term. By the middle of his tribunician year Tiberius’ opponents began to view him as a demagogic revolutionary.15

That Tiberius’ opponents were much perturbed over these constitutional threats is clearly attested in the ancient writers. According to Plutarch, who dismissed the charge as mere rationalization, it was alleged “that Tiberius was introducing a re-distribution of land for the confusion of the body politic [τῆς πόλεως], and was stirring up a general revolution.” 16 Again, Plutarch records the “greatest” of the accusations against Tiberius was that he “deposed his colleague from the tribunate and canvassed for a second tribuneship himself.” 17 Both charges are of an essentially constitutional nature. The timing of the final move against Tiberius seems significant. The Senate had been convened and Tiberius’ opponents were demanding of the Claudian consul Mucius Scaevola that he take action against Tiberius in his extraordinary effort to be re-elected. Just then, here and it is likely that these acts of Tiberius occurred during the campaign for re-election.

15 Guided by idealism, Tiberius initiated measures which ultimately harmed all the aristocratic groups, even the Claudians. The division of Roman politicians into populares and optimates, with the decreased importance of the older factional groups, was a consequence. See the discussion in L. R. Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley, 1949), ch. 1. Cf. R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939), pp. 11 ff.

16 Ti. Grachus, 9, 3.

17 Agis and Cleomenes and the Gracchi Compared, 5, 1. It was Cicero’s opinion that the deposition of Octavius was what ruined Tiberius: De Legibus, III, 10. The language of the Livian Epitome (58) regarding this incident is especially interesting: “Gracchus then went so insane [in eum furorem exarsit] as to remove from office . . . his colleague M. Octavius . . .” (Loeb tr.).
the event which fired the aristocratic opposition to action—if Plutarch may be trusted in such details—was a false report that Tiberius was demanding a crown—that is to say, tyrannical authority. In Plutarch’s words, “Nasica demanded that the consul should come to the rescue of the state and put down the tyrant.” When Scaevola gave only limited assurance, Nasica accused the consul of betraying the state and called on the senators to support “the laws” and follow him. He and a crowd of supporters seized sticks, stones, and pieces of wooden benches (would they not have been better armed if the attack had been previously planned?) and, routing Tiberius’ supporters, killed him and 300 others.

Is there any evidence suggesting what type of revolutionary Tiberius’ opponents saw in the young tribune? Can it be determined more exactly what sort of pattern was now conjured up in their minds? In any intellectual field such as the study of constitutional history, the Romans were turning increasingly to the Greek experience. And for the Roman of the Gracchan period the chief interpreter of the Greek political experience was certainly Polybius. This author had recently completed his history. His flattering opinion of Rome and the Roman constitution surely made his work popular and widely read among the Roman upper classes, and this probability applies especially to the major faction in opposition to Tiberius, that is, the Scipionians. It is well known that Polybius was very close to Scipio Aemilianus, living in his home after he was brought to Rome as a hostage about 167 B.C., tutoring him, and later no doubt taking an important part in the so-called “Scipionic Circle.” Some notice of Polybius’ view of Greek constitutional development as set down in his Roman history is therefore likely to be fruitful to the purpose of this study.18

18 Ti. Grachus, 19, 2-3. Note also the report of Plutarch (ibid., 17, 4) that Blossius was concerned that Tiberius should not give the impression that he was aiming at tyranny. See also Florus, II, 2, 7.

19 Most of Polybius’ constitutional ideas are found in Book VI of his history, but there are scattered references elsewhere. As Polybius was an enemy of the social and economic revolution both in Greece and Rome, so Plutarch’s major source for the period of Cleomenes, the contemporary historian Phylarchus, was a friend of the revolution. See the discussion by W. W. Tarn, “The Social Question in the Third Century,” in J. B. Bury and others, The Hellenistic Age (Cambridge, 1923), p. 139. For a
The son of an important official in the Achaean League, Polybius made a hero of Aratus, a major leader of that League after the middle of the third century B.C. who strongly opposed absolutist forms of government, and who was the major opponent of Cleomenes of Sparta, the revolutionary and somewhat tyrannical social and economic reformer. Polybius disliked Cleomenes, his predecessor Agis, and his later more brutal imitator, Nabis. He was a strong admirer of the mixed constitution of the traditional—if perhaps also partly fictional—Spartan variety, and he felt that Agis, Cleomenes, and Nabis, in their attempts at reform, had accelerated Sparta’s decline. From his knowledge of Greek history, or more precisely, from his knowledge of the ideas of Aristotle and other Greek political theorists, with modifications suggested by experience, Polybius concluded that constitutional development everywhere follows a certain pattern, passing through three stages, each of which tends to deteriorate: monarchy is first and declines to tyranny, followed by aristocracy, which degenerates into oligarchy; then democracy arises, which in turn slips into mob rule and the chaotic end of the cycle.20

Mixed, balanced constitutions, like those of Sparta and of Rome with their elements of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy, Polybius much admired, and felt them to be much more stable than the simpler varieties. Nevertheless, he felt that the same step-by-step deterioration would eventually destroy a mixed constitution as well as the others, for like most historians who have postulated cyclical systems, he made almost universal application of his rules. The decline would come more slowly to such a constitution; the popular assembly would tend to demand an undue share of power, so altering the political balance and, true to the cycle, producing at last mob rule.

Polybius’ comparison of the complex constitutions of Rome and of Sparta was a close one. After distinguishing external and internal causes for the deterioration of such a constitution, he wrote:

---


20 Polybius, VI, 5-9.
When a commonwealth . . . has arrived at a high pitch of prosperity and undisputed power, it is evident that, by the lengthened continuance of great wealth within it, the manner of life of its citizens will become more extravagant; and that rivalry for office, and in other spheres of activity will become fiercer than it ought to be. And as this state of things goes on more and more, the desire of office and the shame of losing reputation, as well as the ostentation and extravagance of living, will prove the beginning of a deterioration. And of this change the people will be credited with being the authors, when they become convinced they are being cheated by some from avarice, and are puffed with flattery by others from love of office. For when that comes about, in their passionate resentment and acting under the dictates of anger, they will refuse to obey any longer, or to be content with having equal powers with their leaders, but will demand to have all or far the greatest themselves. And when that comes to pass the constitution will receive a new name, which sounds better than any other in the world, liberty or democracy; but, in fact, it will become the worst of all governments, mob rule.21

This was Polybius' view of the decline of Sparta: it was, as well, his prediction for the future of Rome. These points are emphasized and reemphasized by Polybius throughout his whole work, which is strongly pragmatic and moralistic. It should be kept in mind that Polybius had set out to explain why, in so short a time, Rome had been able to dominate the Mediterranean world. His answer, in brief, was—her superior constitution. The erosion of it was obviously a crucial matter. Polybius remarked "The chief cause of success or the reverse in all matters is the form of a state's constitution. . . ." 22

The Romans, then, were forewarned of attempts by the popular organs of government to encroach on the powers of the monarchical magistrates or the aristocratic Senate. They were alerted to watch for lower-class dissatisfaction with their political privileges and with their economic position as well, in a time of growing extravagance of the richer classes. Indeed, Polybius so well described the Roman situation in the Gracchan period that it seems possible that he may have introduced new material into this section of his history after Tiberius Gracchus' death.23 But

21 Polybius, VI, 57 (translation of E. S. Schuckburgh).
22 VI, 2, 10.
23 See von Fritz's discussion of the composition of the history, op. cit.,
the Roman nobiles did not require a Polybius to persuade them to be jealous of their prerogatives. Also, the specific comparison between Roman and Spartan experience was a natural one which thinking Romans had no doubt already considered. Moreover, it may be taken for granted that the comparison of Agis and Cleomenes of Sparta with Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus was not original with Plutarch. In the case of Sparta, Agis, Cleomenes, and Nabis had made themselves actually tyrants; their programs had included schemes of land redistribution and debt-cancellation; and their methods were extra-constitutional. Any Roman student of Greek history would therefore have equated with economic revolution the establishment of tyranny. Further, the Romans had learned their lesson also from practical experience. They, too, had fought Nabis, under Flamininus in 195 B.C. When social revolution infiltrated the Greek leagues generally, they dissolved them (after 146 B.C.) and put the propertied classes in control in the cities. As Cleomenes had his Stoic adviser, so Tiberius had his, Blossius of Cumae; 24

pp. 31 ff. Also see C. O. Brink and F. W. Walbank, "The Constitution of the Sixth Book of Polybius," C. Q., N.S. IV (1954), pp. 97-122; also F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, I (Oxford, 1957), pp. 101 ff., 292 ff., 636. Walbank thinks it unlikely that Polybius added much at a later date. However, it seems necessary to choose between (a) astounding prescience on Polybius' part, or (b) some minor late additions, of which (b) seems more acceptable. 24

See the collection of material relating to Roman contacts with Greek revolutionary movements and leaders in M. Cary, The Legacy of Alexander; A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.C. (New York, 1932), pp. 192 ff. and 204 f.

25 It has been plausibly suggested that Blossius' ideas were not necessarily Stoic: D. R. Dudley, "Blossius of Cumae," J. R. S., XXXI (1941), pp. 94 ff. And it is true, no doubt, as G. H. Sabine and S. B. Smith have said (in the introduction to Cicero's On the Commonwealth [Columbus, Ohio, 1929], p. 23), "The political importance of Stoicism lay precisely in the reaction of the ethical and religious principles upon political thinking, not in a specific theory of the state." It will be remembered that the Scipionic group had its own Stoic, Panaetius—who, however, admired Rome and adapted Stoic ideas to the Roman political and social climate. Still, the Stoics' egalitarianism seems to have led many of them toward theoretical communism, as it appears was the case with Cleomenes' adviser Sphaerus (see Cary, op. cit., p. 156); and both Zeno and Iambulus seem to have constructed a sort of communal utopia (see the discussion in Tarn, loc. cit., p. 131, p. 17). However, surely...
if Tiberius at first limited his land redistribution to *ager publicus* and did not follow the Greeks in demanding debt-cancellation, who knew what was to come next?

The opponents of Gracchus, then, saw in him the image of the Spartan tyrants in the setting sketched by the pen of Polybius. It is not new, of course, to say that these enemies of Tiberius Gracchus thought him to be aiming at tyranny. The historians in the ancient period mention that he was called a tyrant; both Plutarch and Cicero so quoted Nasica. But modern writers ordinarily have not believed that anyone really thought that Tiberius was aiming at tyranny. They have followed Plutarch, who, though he mentioned the objections to Tiberius of a constitutional nature, dismissed them as mere pretexts. Nevertheless, in view of the knowledge and experience of Scipio Nasica and others of the Gracchan opposition, in the light of which, naturally, they interpreted Tiberius’ actions, it appears extremely likely that Nasica and the rest were actually convinced he was aiming at demogogic tyranny. These nobles feared that the deterioration predicted by Polybius was upon them. Admitted that these men saw what they wanted to see, that is, what best served their own interests, there is yet no good reason to doubt that the murderers genuinely thought they had saved the state by killing a would-be tyrant—perhaps a well-intentioned tyrant, like Cleomenes of Sparta—but a tyrant nonetheless, whose actions were bound to result in the ruin of the Republic. A Nabis might follow in due time.

Henry C. Boren.

University of North Carolina.

Cleomenes was chiefly influenced by the romanticized, partly fictional accounts of the Lycurgan constitution of early Sparta.

26 Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus*, 19, 3; Cicero, *De Re Publica*, VI, 8; the latter is a rather indirect quotation in Macrobius, *Commentary*, IV, 2.

27 Neither E. Badian’s excellent book, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford, 1958), nor the article of H. H. Scullard, “Scipio Aemilianus and Roman Politics,” *J. R. S.*, L (1960), pp. 59-74, came to the attention of the author until after this article was in finished form. The former extends the views expressed here of the importance to Tiberius Gracchus of his father’s eastern diplomatic connections, and the latter agrees that Scipio’s opposition to Tiberius was based primarily on constitutional grounds.